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Sundstrom: Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific,

about committing forces to LAM SON
719, and in 2014, when ISIS seized
Fallujah, Maliki allowed the problem
to fester. In neither case was suppression of a hostile insurgency put above
the objective of maintaining a grip
on power—much to the frustration
of Washington. As Henry Kissinger
would later say of LAM SON 719, it was
an “operation [that was] conceived in
ambivalence and assailed by skepticism,
[and] proceeded in confusion.” Today
what was then the town of Tchepone lies
abandoned, though the lessons of 1971
remain fresh. Sander’s work will likely
remain the definitive record of the Laos
campaign until such time as archives
in Hanoi are made fully available.
JOSEPH HAMMOND

Haddick, Robert. Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2014. 288pp. $37.95

Robert Haddick proposes a revised U.S.
strategy toward China. He argues—
agreeing with recent U.S. national
security strategies—that continued U.S.
forward presence is the only option that
supports the American objectives of “an
open international economic system;
respect for universal values around the
world; and a rules-based international
order that promotes peace, security, and
opportunity through stronger cooperation.” He articulates a two-front effort
to ensure China rises within the existing
international structure: positive reinforcement of good behavior combined
with significant defense reforms to
allow punishment of bad behavior.
Haddick discusses the nature of China’s
military modernization and how it
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bodes ill for the U.S. ability to punish
Chinese transgressions against international order. He believes that current
U.S. force posture is inadequate because U.S. air and naval capabilities are
vulnerable to Chinese land-, air-, and
sea-launched cruise missiles and ballistic
missiles. And future U.S. capabilities—
the F-35 in particular—have insufficient range to operate from existing
bases under the antiaccess umbrella
created by these weapons. To counter
the tactical and operational challenges
these weapons create he advocates the
Pentagon develop a new long-range
bomber and long-range cruise missiles able to penetrate Chinese airspace
and hold critical targets at risk. He also
promotes autonomous aerial projectiles
based on a 1990s DARPA model to
locate and destroy road-mobile missile launchers. He argues convincingly
that his acquisition proposals solve the
likely tactical and operational problems
of a future war with China, but he does
not engage with the highly contested
literature on the strategic effectiveness of
airpower. Without a theory of strategic
effectiveness, he fails to make the case
that these new capabilities would support his strategy and influence Chinese
decision making during crisis or war.
Additional proposals are designed to
threaten presumed Chinese fears. These
include encouraging America’s regional
allies to develop their own antiaccess
capabilities on the First Island Chain,
improving U.S. Navy blockading capacity, developing irregular warfare capacity
among China’s minority populations,
and developing antisatellite weaponry.
However, if China continues its policy of
“salami slicing,” these weapons and plans
will never see battle. By incrementally
challenging the existing regional order,
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China is, as Haddick agrees, achieving
its objectives without risking war. Beijing
understands there is a threshold for U.S.
military response and will continue to
operate below it. An American president
would be loath to fire the first shots over
the Chinese occupation of an uninhabited island. Haddick therefore argues the
United States should develop policies to
encourage China to follow the existing
international rules in letter and spirit.
Unfortunately, he does not detail these
policies, leaving his strategy wanting.
Haddick states that strategy is about
managing risk. While much of what
Haddick proposes seems commonsensical, it is unfinished, and this poses risks.
Focusing only on punitive measures
against possible Chinese actions runs
the risk of ignoring the ways China
has played by the rules while furthering a mind-set where every development in the PLA’s modernization is
perceived as a threat to U.S. regional
interests—regardless of Chinese intentions. This book should be read as part
of an ongoing and equally unfinished
debate on how to handle a rising China.
IAN T. SUNDSTROM

Hughes, Wayne P., ed. The U.S. Naval Institute
on Naval Tactics. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2015. 192pp. $21.95

The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics
is a collection of thirteen essays assembled by Captain Wayne Hughes,
USN (Ret.)—author of several books,
most notably Fleet Tactics and Coastal
Combat and Military Modeling for Decision Making. Captain Hughes is also
an accomplished naval officer, having
served as commanding officer of USS
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Hummingbird (MSC 192) and USS
Morton (DD 948). Notable authors appearing in On Tactics include Admiral
Woodward, RN, who commanded
British forces in the Falklands War, and
Giuseppe Fioravanzo, Admiral of the
Fleet, Italian Navy. On Tactics is part
of the U.S. Naval Institute’s new Wheel
Books series, which is a collection of
books containing some of the Naval
Institute’s most well-regarded articles
from Proceedings—and other sources—
on such topics as naval leadership,
command, strategy, and cooperation.
On Tactics is well worth the reader’s
time, and appropriate for both junior
and senior officers. It benefits greatly
from Hughes’s insightful commentary
and tactful editing, which boils the combined length of the selected essays down
to a manageable 190 pages. Although the
topic of tactics is broadly applicable to
all naval communities, surface warfare
officers will probably have the easiest
time relating to the selected essays.
Of the thirteen essays in the volume, a
favorite was “Missile Chess: A Parable,”
written by Hughes himself. “Missile
Chess” describes a game created by
Hughes in which players sit down to play
a traditional game of chess but with a major twist: the players have a fixed number
of “missiles” that they must distribute
among their pieces as they see fit. The
pieces still move according to the rules of
regular chess, but each time they capture
an opposing piece they expend one “missile.” Once a piece’s missile inventory is
depleted a piece can still move but can no
longer capture. After he walks us through
several hypothetical scenarios, it is clear
that despite its simplicity, missile chess
nicely elucidates some of the most vexing operational challenges with which a
modern naval commander must contend.
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